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Abstract
We survey the evidence on the relationship between board and top management team
attributes and firm performance in the Netherlands (sample of 94 listed firms). To this aim
we develop hypotheses by using sources from the strategic management and the corporate
governance literature. Dutch corporations generally have a two-tier board system. We use
the size of the top management team (TMT) and their average age as well as the size of the
supervisory board (RVC) and the percentage of outside members as attributes of corporate
performance. Our base model consists of two performance indicators: a composite financial
accounting measure (of ROA, ROS, and ROE) and a market-based indicator  (standardized
stock prize increase). Control variables are: log of total assets as an indicator of the size of a
firm, leverage and adjusted cash flow/total assets as indicators of financial structure,
coefficients of variation of sales and ROA as measures of environmental uncertainty
(dynamics), and diversification as a measure of risk-spread. In general, we conclude for the
year 1996, that by using the base model, direct linear and non-linear relationships between
the TMT/board variables and performance are not existent. Also, the interaction effects
with environmental dynamics as a moderating variable are tested. From this analysis it
becomes evident that, although environmental uncertainty has a clear direct relationship
with performance, it has no significance as a moderating variable. Only in one case the
interaction with size of the board leads to a significant result. Indicating (instead of the
hypothesized inverted U-shaped relationship) a U-shaped relationship between RVC and
performance.2
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932) the conflict between the owner
and the manager of the firm is in the spotlight. If ownership is dispersed there will
be a free-rider problem, leading to higher agency costs of capital and lower firm
performance. In the last decade new attention is given to this issue of so-called
corporate governance. How can a supplier of capital assure its fair returns? La
Porta et al. (1998) review the alleged impact of differences in law and other
institutions on the growth of firms. It appears that in some countries (especially the
French law countries) protection of the shareholders is weak. This should
undermine the control of the shareholder on the firm. In the French law countries
capital markets are usually less developed than in common law countries. This
implies that disciplining through takeover-threats is almost absent.
The owners of the firm can try to influence the quality of the board and through
that the performance of the firm. It is known in the continental European
economies that this is common practice. For instance in Germany, banks have a
serious influence on board composition (see Edwards and Fischer, 1994). If owners
do not have majority voting rights and a takeover-threat is not credible, the ultimate
attempt to solve the agency problem is to maintain a relation of trust with the
incumbent management team and to gradually increase the quality of the board.
This policy assumes that the quality of the board positively influences firm
performance. Although the quality of the board is also relevant to firms operating
in more (hostile) market environments, shareholders do not have to worry as much
as compared to more bank-based financial systems. Especially for continental
European shareholders it is interesting to explore the board attributes-performance
relationship. For instance, it could be in the interest of the supplier of capital  (e.g.
the bank) to monitor the firm and to appoint outside members on the (supervisory)
board. It might also be the case that older top management teams have more
management experience and use their human capital to obtain a better performance.
In this paper we analyze the impact of board attributes on firm performance in an
economy, the Netherlands, where one would expect it to be relevant due to a lack
of takeover-threat and voting power by shareholders. According to La Porta et al.
(1998) the Dutch system has a relatively low score on shareholder protection, but a
relatively high performance of firms. It is therefore a challenge to investigate the3
influence of board attributes on firm performance. The Dutch economy provides an
unique example in this respect with its two-tier board system. According to Dutch
law a supervisory board is mandatory for most listed domestic firms. This means
that in these firms an independent supervisory board is installed aside the top
management team. To a certain extent, stakeholders can influence the composition
of this board. In this respect the Dutch case differs to a large extent from its US or
UK counterparts.
Most research regarding top management teams and the role of boards of directors
has focussed, however, on single-boards in Anglo-Saxon firms (c.f. Boone et al.,
1995). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stand up for more comparative research in their
survey on corporate governance. Following their argument, in this paper the Dutch
case is subject of research. The main problem this paper addresses is the following
question: are both top management team and supervisory board attributes related to
firm performance? To answer this question, we exploit a data set of 94 Dutch non-
financial firms that are to a large extent placed under the structural regime (see
section 2), and are listed at the Amsterdam Exchange (AEX). We test for the
impact of top management team and board size and composition on firm
performance. Apart from the scientific challenge, the practical value of this paper is
evident
1. Board attributes are factors that can be directly controlled by management
and supervisory boards them selves (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). As such these
variables can be considered as options in decision making.
The relevance of research at different attributes (such as age, size, composition) of
these institutions is discussed from two different streams of literature. The upper
echelon literature stresses the attributes of top management teams. In the tradition
of the upper echelon research program proposed by Hambrick and Mason (1984)
and Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) much empirical research is performed related
to attributes of top management teams
2. This stream of literature concentrates
mostly on the characteristics and functioning of top management levels in firms
                                                          
1 For example, see the case of Philips described by Metze (1997).
2 See for instance Norburn and Birley (1988); Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990);
Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991); Hitt and Tyler (1991); Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992);
Michel and Hambrick (1992); Wiersema and Bantel (1992); Haleblian and Finkelstein
(1993); Boone et al. (1995); Sanders and Carpenter (1998).4
and not on governance aspects. The corporate governance literature is more
oriented at monitoring (governance) and attributes of supervisory boards (Zahra
and Pearce, 1989). Empirical research in this field is often based on research in the
fields of finance and economics
3.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we first discuss the relevant
theoretical insights and institutional context. After that we develop a set of
hypotheses. In section 3 we deal with the sample, the research method, and the
data. Section 4 presents the main results. Finally, in section 5 the conclusions with
regard to the hypotheses are discussed.
2 Theory and hypotheses
2.1 Theoretical background
In this section different sets of literatures are shortly discussed. These literatures
are to some extent complementary and stress different perspectives with regard to
top management teams and boards.
From the point of view of the strategic management literature the strength of an
organization depends on the ability to anticipate and respond to external threats and
opportunities and internal pressures for change. By making strategic decisions, and
initiating action (and change), top (or strategic) management responds to signals.
Moreover, it anticipates current and future developments and trends and develops
proactive policies and visions about its position in the market (Hamel and Prahalad,
1994). In the strategic choice perspective the nature and effectiveness of strategic
choices are a function of the objective situation and the top management’s
perception and interpretation capacities. As strategic choice assumes discretional
latitude for decision-makers in making strategic choices and a large behavioral
                                                          
3 See for instance  Bethel and Liebeskind (1993); Barnhart  et al. (1994); Huse (1994);
Sunduramurthy (1996); Daily and Dalton (1997); Bhagat and Black (1998). In different
countries corporate governance is subject of special attention. In the UK, the Cadbury
committee introduced a code of best practice. In the US the American Law Institute
generated a 1500 page document with principles on corporate governance. In the
Netherlands, a review committee, led by a former top-manager Peters, argued to give more
power to the shareholder and to put more weight on the two-tier character of Dutch
governance (c.f. report Committee Peters, 1997).5
component, it reflects the idiosyncracies of decision-makers (Hambrick and
Mason, 1984). Pfeffer (1983) indicates that, whereas organization theory often
refers to subjective variables (such as norms and roles), more objective variables
are empirically used, because they are facts that can be observed. Therefore, with
respect to strategy formation and organizational performance, the point of view of
the composition and role of management boards or top management teams (upper
echelon) is often discussed by considering a set of (objective) demographic
attributes (such as the age, organizational tenure, functional background, and
education of top managers). There is empirical evidence that top management
makes a difference (e.g. see Norburn and Birley, 1988; Wiersema and Bantel,
1992). However, this statement must also be considered with care. For example
West and Schwenk (1996) failed to find a significant relationship between top
management team demographics and performance. So, the idea of recognizing that
top management teams are important for an organization’s performance and that
they for this reason might be a valuable and scarce resource that would be hard for
competitors to imitate (Collin, 1998), is still to be tested.
In the external control literature strategic decisions are considered as largely
constrained by the external environment. For instance the ‘population ecology’ and
‘life cycle’ approach assume respectively relative inertia and little adaptation
capacity of organizations (Boone et al., 1995). In this literature the one-sided
impact of the environment is stressed. The environment determines the
organizational context (and not the other way around). The strategic choice and
external control perspectives, however, can be integrated (Hitt and Tyler, 1991),
because both perspectives, more or less, take into account the influence of the
environment on strategic decisions and/or performance. In this context we use the
term upper echelon perspective (c.f. Hambrick and Mason, 1984, Finkelstein and
Hambrick, 1996).
In the corporate governance literature the idea wins ground that it is in the
shareholders interest to promote the development of long term relations, trust, and
commitment amongst various stakeholders (OECD, 1998). In general, however,
corporate governance is associated with the ‘principal-agent’ problem. This
problem concerns the possible conflicts of interests of managers with those of the
shareholders (investors). In this context the governance aspects of boards of6
directors is an important part of the discussion. According to Goodstein et al.
(1994) there are three perspectives related to the functional duties of the board. The
first refers to the ‘resource dependency theory’ that emphasizes the institutional
function in which the board helps to link the organization to its external
environment and secure critical resources. The second refers to the governance
function. Agency theory stresses that the board of directors can be considered as an
internal governance and monitoring mechanism for alignment of shareholders and
management, which can discipline or remove ineffective management teams
(Barnhart et al., 1994). The implicit assumption of agency theory is that corporate
boards of directors perform their governing function effectively (Sundaramurthy,
1996). The third function is the board’s contribution to the strategic decision
making processes in organizations. Members of the board of directors are, to a
certain extent, also actors in strategic decision making processes (Fama and Jensen,
1983). “The strategic role of the board involves taking important decisions on
strategic change that help the organization adapt to important environmental
changes” (Goodstein et al., 1994: 242). Given the relevance of these three
functions of the board (networking, monitoring, strategic decision-making),
different attributes of the board may be relevant for firm performance. Empirical
studies in this field have focused on various board attributes, such as board size,
insider/outsider ratio, board members’ stock ownership, board size, and CEO-
duality in relation to firm performance  (c.f. Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Rechner
and Dalton, 1991; Barnhart et al., 1994; Huse, 1994; Sundaramurthy, 1996; Daily
and Dalton, 1997). However, a recent meta-analysis of Dalton et al. (1998) of 54
empirical studies showes, for the US-situation, that board composition (especially
insiders vs. outsiders) virtually has no effect on firm performance.  This result also
asks for verification in other corporate governance systems (e.g. the Netherlands).
The upper echelon perspective is consistent with insights that managerial
responsibilities are unlikely to be the exclusive domain of just one individual
(Wiersema and Bantel, 1992: 92). The corporate governance perspective shows in
this way the importance of the board of directors in governing and monitoring.
Sanders and Carpenter (1998) discuss the relevance of a combined perspective in
this respect, for example the size of a top management team may also have
implications for the ability of the management team to manage complexity and for
the ability of the supervisory board to manage the team (p.161).7
2.2 Institutional context
The corporate governance structure of Dutch firms is special in a certain way. The
structure itself is often seen as a device to limit the influence of the individual
shareholder. For our purpose it is therefore necessary to discuss two key issues of
the structure. Firstly, the impact of corporate governance on the management
structure of most Dutch firms, and secondly, the role of this structure in the general
view of defense mechanisms. We argue that the so-called structural regime allows
for more external influence on the one hand, but restricts it on the other through co-
optation. Furthermore, it seems that the structural regime is a substitute for other
defense mechanisms.
Within Dutch firms, like in Germany, a two-tier corporate control mechanism is
active: the top management team (the ‘Raad van Bestuur’: RvB) and the
supervisory board (‘Raad van Commissarissen’: RvC). The top management team
controls day-to-day operations. The chairman of the management team is the most
prominent director and Chief Executive Officer (CEO). He is not involved with the
supervisory board (no CEO-duality). The Dutch system of a supervisory board can
be characterized by three models (Gelauff and Den Broeder, 1996) of which the
structural regime is the most important one. Under conditions of the structural
regime, the presence of a supervisory board is obligatory for limited liability
companies with a subscribed capital of 25 million guilders, at least 100 employees
in the Netherlands, and the presence of a workers council (companies that are a
subsidiary of a structural holding are exempted). Gelauff and Den Broeder (1996)
estimate 37 per cent of all Dutch public and private firms to be in this class. Of the
listed companies two third belongs to the structural model. The members of the
supervisory board are appointed by co-optation, members of the incumbent
supervisory board elect new members. Top management (and especially the CEO)
in practice substantially influences the composition of the supervisory board (Van
der Goot and Van het Kaar, 1997). This is a crucial difference with for instance the
German case where the shareholders elect the members of the supervisory board.
The supervisory board ratifies important managerial decisions and it determines the
annual statement of accounts (it also requires approval by the shareholders
meeting). The supervisory board members may legally appoint and dismiss8
members of the top management team, although this rarely happens (which is
probably not a big surprise given the influence of management on the composition
of the board).
The mitigated structural regime applies to those companies that meet the three
criteria set out above, but are controlled by foreign companies. The foreign
controlling company’s general meeting of shareholders approves the annual
statement of accounts and composes the management board.
The common regime applies to the remaining companies. These companies may
voluntary install a supervisory board. Generally, this board has less power and the
shareholder meeting takes up the control of the account and the composition of the
management board and supervisory board.
Our sample of listed firms generally falls into the category of the structural regime
(77 out of 94 firms are under the structural regime; 23 took up this regime
voluntarily, the remaining 17 firms are under foreign control and fall under the so-
called mitigated structural regime). In this paper, by focusing on the relationship
between at the one hand top management teams and supervisory boards and at the
other hand firm performance, an indirect relationship with strategic decision
making is assumed. For corporations it can be defended that both organizational
top levels (top management teams and supervisory boards) are responsible for the
ultimate performance of an organization.
Next, we turn to the role of the structural regime in limiting the influence of the
individual shareholder. De Jong and Moerland (1999) show that the average
number of defense instruments used by Dutch firms is 2 as opposed to 6 by US
firms. The Dutch Monitoring Committee on Corporate Governance (1998) reviews
the instruments to limit the influence of the individual shareholder as follows (apart
from the structural regime):
1.  The issuing of certificates of deposits through an administrative office. This
implies that the voting power remains within the administrative office, since
holders of certificates transfer their voting rights. In our sample 36 of the 94
firms use certificates of deposits.
2.  Block ownership of the major stakeholder over 40 per cent. Of the 94 firms in
our sample 21 firms have a large blockowner.9
3.  The issuing of priority shares through foundations. 22 of our 94 firms issued
priority shares.
4.  The issuing of finance prefs. This is a rather weak instrument and not
considered to be a real powerful instrument to limit voting rights (see
Monitoring Committee, 1998). 15 firms in our sample issued finance prefs.
5.  The issuing of preference shares held by a continuity foundation as an anti-
takeover instrument. 61 of our 94 firms use this instrument.
De Jong and Moerland (1999) show that the defense mechanisms are, to a large
extent, substitutes for each other. This supports the findings of La Porta et al.
(1998) about the relatively low score on shareholder protection in the Dutch
situation (see section 1) and also underscores the importance of the supervisory
board, as an alternative instrument for TMT control in the Dutch situation.
2.3 Hypotheses
Using the bases of empirical research of the preceding sections and taking into
account the availability of data, we selected the following set of top management
team (TMT) and board attributes: size, age, outsiders/insiders
4. In general, it is
plausible to expect that the board and TMT attributes and performance/success are
not specifically linearly related. A curvilinear (e.g. log or inverted U-shaped)
relationship might be expected representing diminishing returns from a certain
point.
Size
TMT size is likely to influence the strategic capacity of an organization. According
to Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993), team size is often considered as a control
variable. Empirical results show that large groups are more effective compared to
smaller ones, because large groups have more problem-solving capabilities in the
sense of a larger repertoire of problem sensing, interpretation, analyzing,
evaluating, and solution capacities. These capabilities may enhance proactive
strategic decision-making. This, however, comes at a price. Smaller groups tend to
have less coordination and communication problems compared to larger groups,
                                                          
4 It is important to note that this research is based on secondary data. The application of
other equally relevant variables like tenure and work experience is simply not possible,
because of lacking data in this respect.10
they also tend to be more cohesive and satisfactorily for their members, finally
their decisions and consensus seem to be reached more efficiently (Haleblian and
Finkelstein, 1993). Large groups are supposed to have greater information-
processing and decision-making capabilities than small teams. Hambrick and
D’Aveni suggested that "at a basic level, the resources available on a team result
from how many people are on it" (1992: 1449). Note that in a small group the
addition of one person can increase team heterogeneity substantially (Wiersema
and Bantel, 1992). According to Hambrick and D’aveni (1992), inverted U-shaped
relations indicate very small and very large groups having disadvantages. As size
increases, it may become difficult after a certain point (size) for managers to reach
decisions in a timely fashion.
Hypothesis 1: The size of the top management team and firm performance/success
shows an inverted U-shaped relationship.
The same argumentation is valid for the size of the board. Zahra and Pearce (1989:
315) indicate that there is a threshold were board size may have a negative effect
on company performance. Based on their arguments we hypothesize that the
relationship between board size and company performance is nonlinear,
representing an inverted U-shape.
Hypothesis 2: The size of the supervisory board and firm performance /success
show an inverted U-shaped relationship.
Age
5
Norburn and Birley (1988) and Hitt and Tyler (1991) found that age influences
strategic decision-making performance. According to Hambrick and Mason (1984)
managerial youth appears to be associated with novelty, unprecedented actions, and
risk-taking. This may be a consequence of the problems of older executives to
integrate information in decision-making and that they tend to have less confidence
in their decisions. Taylor (1975), however, indicates that this must be considered
with care, because older managers also seek more information, evaluate
                                                          
5 One of the empirical results of Hitt and Tyler (1991:346) was that age and amount of
work experience are highly interrelated, the effects are interwoven and may not be isolated.
They therefore advise to consider the combined effects of these factors. In fact this research
also confirmed the earlier findings of Taylor (1975), who found a high correlation between11
information more accurately, and take more time to make decisions. Another
explanation may be that flexibility decreases and rigidity and resistance to change
increase as people age (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). A third reason may be that
financial and career security is more important for older managers (Wiersema and
Bantel, 1992). The result is that older managers tend to be more conservative and
lack the ambition or ability to provide direction for strategic change. Moreover,
ageing top managers or executives seem to have difficulty to cope with corporate
success or to continue success (Thorborg, 1987). In this case, also an inverted U-
shaped relationship seems plausible.
Hypothesis 3: The average age of a top management team and firm performance/
success shows an inverted U-shaped relationship.
Outsiders in supervisory board
Berle and Means (1932) were the first to study the implications of the separation
between ownership and control in corporations. Next to provisions such as
executive compensation contracts and equity ownership by managers, the
supervisory board is one of the means to cope with this potential controlling- and
incentive conflict (Mayers et al., 1997). In situations were agency costs between
shareholders (owners) and management (control) may be severe, the supervisory
board may play a crucial role (Barnhart et al., 1994). Especially, the proportion of
independent outside directors in the board has been subject of research (c.f.
Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Lee at al., 1992; Barnhart et al., 1994). In this
research mixed results varying from a weak to a strong relation between outside
directors in the board and performance show up. For instance, Rosenstein and
Wyatt (1990) find that the addition of outside directors is associated with increases
in firm value. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) also conclude that there is no effect on
appointment of new inside directors. Bhagat and Black (1997, 1998) conclude that
there is no convincing evidence that board composition affects (future)
performance. For past performance there is some evidence found. However, Klein
(1998) shows that independent directors can add value if they are embedded in an
appropriate committee structure. Barnhart et al. (1994) find that the proportion of
independent outside directors has a significant (negative) curvilinear relationship
                                                                                                                                                   
age and years of management experience (p.79). Accordingly, we don’t consider experience
separately, but focus on age (also because of availability of data).12
with overall performance (market-to-book ratio). These arguments suggest that an
inverted U-shaped relationship might be plausible.
Hypothesis 4: The relative number of outsiders in the supervisory board and firm
performance/success show an inverted U-shaped relationship.
Furthermore, a nonlinear relationship can be relevant to test the entrenchment
hypothesis. If a board gets larger (till a certain point) it becomes more difficult for
TMT-members not to behave in the firm’s interest. An inverted U-shaped
relationship suggests an optimal size of the board in the sense of a maximum size.
Finally, environments differ in their degree of turbulence. The extent of discretion
environments confer to TMTs (and boards) is dependent on the amount of
complexity and uncertainty (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). The larger the
complexity and uncertainty, the more dynamic the environment will be. A dynamic
environment asks for another composition of the TMT and/or board compared to a
stable environment (c.f. Walton, 1998). Therefore, we expect environment
(dynamic/stable) to be a moderating variable in this respect.
3 Data description and research method
We use a cross-section for 1996 of 94 Dutch listed firms at the A(msterdam Stock)
EX(change). This sample largely consists of firms in the manufacturing sector. We
focus on manufacturing firms and skip firms involved in services, to exclude
effects due to different economic sectors. We include firms that only register their
activity within the Netherlands, which leaves out for instance Royal Dutch Shell,
the largest company in terms of total assets.
One of the crucial issues in analyzing firm performance is the precise measurement
of performance. There is a wide list of possible indicators available. One can make
a rough distinction in forward- and backward looking indicators. Forward-looking
indicators use stock market information. One can think of market-to-book ratio’s
(or Tobin’s Q), relative stock price increases or Economic Value Added (EVA)
concepts (e.g. Zahra and Pearce, 1989); Barnhart et al., 1994). On the other hand
one can use financial accounting data to indicate past performance. Often used
indicators in this respect to measure firm performance or success are Return on
Assets (ROA), Return on Sales (ROS), Return on Investment (ROI), or Return on13
Equity (ROE) (e.g. Weiner and Mahoney, 1981; Hitt and Tyler, 1991; Rechner and
Dalton, 1991; Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Parnell,
1998). Dalton et al. (1998) discuss the pros and cons of both points of view.  They
conclude that there appears to be no consensus regarding the efficacy of reliance on
one set of indicators (accounting-based) or another (market-based). Therefore, in
this paper we exploit both points of view:
1.  The standardized stock-price increase (SSPI);
2.  A composite measure of Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Sales (ROS) and
Return on Equity (ROE) (Perform).
In order to analyze the effect of board composition we need to condition the
performance indicators on all relevant indicators (c.f. the models of Barnhart et al.,
1994 and Chririnko et al., 1998). We use the log of total assets as an indicator of
the size of the firm, leverage as an indicator of the capital structure, the ratio of
cash flow to total assets as an indicator of the capacity of the firm to generate
inside capital, a measure of diversification to condition upon the degree of risk
aversion in selling end products in real markets and an indicator for environmental
uncertainty. The latter variable might be seen from both an irreversibility point-of-
view (having a negative impact) or from a real option view (leading to a positive
impact on the growth of the firm). Moreover, we use industry dummies to correct
for branch-specific effects.
Data is gathered from multiple sources: AMADEUS
6, Bestuurders en
Commissarissen (directors and supervisors), Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen
(Financieele Dagblad)
7, Jaarboek van Nederlandse Ondernemingen
8, and REACH
9.
For the balance sheet and income/loss-statement we use the AMADEUS-data set
and the Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen. As a source for the TMT and board
variables we used the Jaarboek van Nederlandse Ondernemingen, Handboek
Nederlandse Beursfondsen (Financieele Dagblad), and Bestuurders en
Commissarissen. In table 1 the variables are defined.
                                                          
6 AMADEUS is a data  set covering over 200,000 firms in Europe.
7 This book contains data on 165 listed firms.
8 This book contains data on 187 listed firms.
9 This is the version of AMADEUS for the Netherlands.14
Table 1 Variables and their definition
Variable Definition
Perform The arithmetic average of the standardized Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Sales
(ROS) and Return on Equity (ROE) (c.f. Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986)
ROA Return on assets: before-tax profits plus financial expense as a percentage of total assets
(indicator for profitability)
ROS Return on sales: before-tax profits plus financial expense as a percentage of total sales
ROE Return on equity: before-tax profits plus financial expense as a percentage of total
equity
SSPI The standardized stock-price increase of year 1996 compared to 1995
TOTAL ASSETS (TA) Total assets minus depreciation (indicator for size) (LogTA is chosen to correct for
large size; see also Mayers et al., 1997)
LEVERAGE (L) Total assets minus equity as a fraction of total assets (indicator for financial structure)
CFA Adjusted cash-flow = cash flow + depreciation
CFA/TA Indicator for financial structure
Cv (ROA) Coefficient of variation of ROA (cv (x) = stdev(x)/abs(mean(x)) 1992-1996
Cv (SAL) Coefficient of variation of sales (cv(x) = stdev(x)/abs(mean(x)) 1992-1996
Environment  DYN Dummy variable, 0 = stable, 1 = dynamic (an indicator for environmental uncertainty:
dynamic/stable environment). We compute the coefficient of variation (standard
deviation over the absolute value of the mean) of sales to proxy for demand uncertainty
and return on assets (= profitability in this paper) to proxy for profit uncertainty. The
dynamics dummy is equal to 1 in case either of these coefficients is bigger than 0.5 (c.f.
Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993).
DIV Percentage of non-core firm activities in industries at the two digit level (REACH). We
define this variable as the percentage of non core activities of a total of 58 sub
categories of activities/industries on the two-digit level, in which the firm is involved
(c.f. Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993). The 58 activity/industry categories are derived
from the Dutch Chamber of Commerce BIK classification (a similar classification to the
JEL classification).
Di i is one of the 8 industry classes; to control for the effect of different industries
RvB Number of members of each TMT
AGERVB Average age of each TMT
RVC Number of members of each supervisory board
OUTRVC Percentage of external members of each supervisory board15
Data analysis
We tested the hypotheses by conducting generalized-least-squares regression
analysis. We estimated equations of the form: PERFORMANCE  = ¦(X,Z) where
PERFORMANCE (Perform, SSPI) denotes the performance variable, X is a set of
our TMT/board variables and Z is a list of control variables. We tested for linear
and nonlinear relationships. Robust-White standard errors are used to control for
heteroscedasticity.
In order to get an impression of the data we give the descriptive statistics (sample
means (m), median value (med), and standard deviation (s)) in Table 2.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable m Med s
Perform 0.00 -0.07 0.87
SSPI 0.00 -0.15 1.00
TA (10
6 DFL) 2674.46 482.04 7915.27
L 61.59 62.49 12.34
CFA/TA 16.61 16.46 6.80
Cv(SALES) 0.18 0.13 0.13
Cv(ROA) 6.64 0.31 58.11
ENVIRON. DYNAMIC 0.34 0 0.48
DIVERSIFICATION 1.99 1.70 2.04
RVB 2.95 3 1.53
RVC 4.95 5 1.83
AGERVB 51.47 52.75 5.32
OUTSRVC (%) 84.30 100 19.94
Source: AMADEUS, Handboek van Nederlandse Beursfondsen, and REACH.
Note that the mean of Perform (consisting of the three standardized return
indicators) is not a standard normally distributed variable. The size of the TMT
ranges from 1-10, with a mean of 2.95. The size of the supervisory board range16
from 2-11, with a mean of 4.95. The average age of the TMT ranges from 37-60,
with a mean of 51.5. The fraction of outsiders in the supervisory board is 84.3%.
The median value for Environment is 0, this reflects the distribution of the firms
over the two categories of the dummy variable; 62 firms operate in a stable
environment (0) and 32 operate in a dynamic environment (1). TA (representing
the size of a firm) shows a median of DFL 2675 mln., a median value of DFL 482
mln., and a standard deviation of DFL 7915 mln., indicating a relatively high
skewed distribution towards smaller firms. Cv(ROA) shows a relative volatile
variation on ROA (period 92-96).
  
Table 3 presents the correlations among the key variables.    
Table 3 Correlation matrix
Variables 1234567 8 9 1 0
1. Perform
2. SSPI 0.47a
3. logTA 0.20 0.17
4. L -0.12 0.21b 0.28a
5. CFA/TA 0.47a 0.26b -0.05 -0.33a
6. DIV 0.05 0.08 0.21b 0.23b 0.07
7. Envir.Dyn. -0.47a -0.12 -0.28a -0.12 -0.15 -0.16
8. RVB 0.19 0.03 0.67a 0.17 0.03 0.11 -0.30a
9. AgeRVB 0.18 0.04 0.26b -0.11 0.15 0.23b -0.08 0.20
10. RVC 0.10 0.18 0.78a 0.20 0.06 0.17 -0.08 046a 0.19
11. OutsRVC -0.09 -0.10 0.05 0.09 -0.15 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01
a indicates significance at the 1% level
b indicates significance at the 5% level
Both performance indicators (Perform and SSPI) are significantly correlated. The
size of the board of directors, the size of the TMT, the age of the TMT,
diversification, leverage, and environmental dynamics show a significant
correlation with size of the firm. CFA/TA is significantly correlated with Perform,
SSPI and Leverage. Diversification is significantly correlated with Leverage and
Age of RVB. Environmental dynamics is significantly negatively correlated with
Perform, and size of RVB . RVC is significantly correlated with RVB.17
4. Results
Starting from the base model (LnTA, L, DIV, CFA/TA, Environ. Dyn), we test
both the linear and quadratic (for inverted U-shaped) relationships with
respectively each of the TMT/Board variables. Also, we test these variables and
relationships in Ln (natural log) – mode to account for differences within variables.
The results are presented in table 4.
Table 4 must be interpreted as follows. In the columns 2-5 the parameter estimates
are presented in which the TMT/board variables are simultaneously tested with the
(control) variables of the base model. The general form of the equation is:
Performi = a0 + a1TBi + a2TBi
2 + SbjiCji + SgjiDji + ei
Where Perform denotes firm performance, TB denotes either a TMT or a board
variable, Cj is a conditioning model variable, Dj is an industry dummy and e a
white-noise error term.
Table 4 Performance and TMT/Board variables
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept  -1.02
(0.990)
4.022
(6.500)
-3.104
(3.064)
71.73
(86.193)
LnTA 0.110
(0.082)
0.111
(0.0088)
0.127
(0.074)
0.125
(0.086)
L -0.003
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.007)
CFA/TA 0.046*
(0.015)
0.045*
(0.016)
0.048*
(0.015)
0.045*
0.016
DIV -0.021
(0.0042)
-0.035
(0.045)
-0.019
(0.041)
-0.030
(0.044)
Environ. Dyn -0.622 *
(0.178)
-0.704*
(0.201)
-0.623*
(0.176)
-0.683*
(0.194)
RVB -0.036
(0.056)
-0.013
(0.133)18
RVC -0.059
(0.057)
-0.327
(0.193)
AGERVB 0.021
(0.017)
-0.169
(0.261)
OUT -0.001
(0.004)
0.010
(0.021)
RVB
2 -0.005
(0.013)
RVC
2 0.024
(0.016)
AGERVB
2 0.002
(0.003)
OUT
2 0.000
(0.000)
LnRVB -0.106
(0.182)
0.256
(0.507)
LnRVC -0.406
(0.275)
-1.995
(1.163)
LnAGERVB 0.909
(0.836)
-38.546
(44.413)
LnOUT -0.071
(0.223)
1.445
(3.867)
LnRVB
2 -0.208
(0.248)
LnRVC
2 0.543
(0.391)
LnAGERVB
2 5.065
(5.727)
LnOUT
2 -0.188
(0.485)
Adj. R
2
F
0.402
4.901
0.391
3.988
0.407
4.986
0.397
4.067
Robust-White standard errors in parentheses. Industry dummies not reported.
* = significant at the 95% confidence level19
Models 1 and 3 show the results of testing the linear relationships between
performance (Perform), control variables, and TMT/board variables. Models 2  and
4 show the results of the nonlinearity models. Concerning the variables of the base
model, we find the following results. Environmental dynamics consistently shows a
significant negative impact on performance. This means that there is a negative
relationship between environmental dynamics (uncertainty) and firm performance.
CFA/TA shows a significant and positive relationship with firm performance. In
general, the results for the TMT/board variables are not significant. The analysis is
also performed for SSPI as performance indicator. The results show the same
pattern. The statistical properties are even worse. For this reason they are not
presented here.
We also tested for interaction effects with environmental uncertainty as a
moderating variable. The model reads:
Performi = a0 + a1TBi + a2TBi
2 + SbjiCji + SgjiDji + h i TBi*Environ.Dyni +
l i TBi
2*Environ.Dyni+ei
In general, these results were insignificant. In this situation only the size of RVC is
significant under conditions of a dynamic environment with a clear minimum as a
threshold value (of about 6). This implies that firms with large boards perform
better. Generally, the results do not improve by testing for interaction effects with
environmental uncertainty as a moderating variable.
5 Conclusion and discussion of the results
The average and median values in general indicate no abnormal values for
corporate activity. In table 5 the results of some other studies in this respect are
shown.20
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of empiricial studies related to relevant variables
Variables Studies Results
Size of TMT -  Norburn & Birley
(1988) (US)
-  Hambrick & D’Aveni
(1992) (US)
-  Wiersema & Bantel
(1992) (US)
-  Haleblian & Finkel-
stein (1993) (US)
Range: 1-11
Mean: 2.47
Mean: 11.72
Range: 2-8
Mean: 4.3
Mean: 3.39
Average age TMT -  Wiersema & Bantel
(1992) (US)
42-69
Size of supervisory board -  Barnhart et al. (1994)
(US)
-  Mayers et al. (1997)
(US)
9.6
12.4
Fraction outsiders in board -  Rosenstein & Wyatt
(1990) (US)
-  Lee et al. (1992) (US)
-  Hambrick & D’Aveni
(1992) (US)
-  Barnhart et al. (1994)
(US)
-  Mayers et al. (1997)
(US)
-  Sundaramurthy et al.
(1997) (US)
65.6%
65.5%
56%
60%
44% stock companies
72% mutuals
68.7%
TA -  Barnhart et al. (1994)
(US)
Mean: 8969.4
Sd.: 20022.51
Comparison of the results of table 5 with the Dutch sample, shows that the firms in
the US samples tend to be larger, that the fraction of outsiders tends to be smaller,
and that the size of the supervisory boards of the US samples tends to be larger.21
In general, we can conclude that by using the base model, direct linear and non-
linear relationships between the TMT/board variables and performance are not
existent. This is the case for two different performance indicators (a composite
financial accounting indicator and a market-based indicator). When we evaluate
these results in terms of the hypotheses of section 2.3 the hypotheses are in this
respect not confirmed. This is in line with the results of West and Schwenk (1996)
and the meta-study of Dalton et al. (1998).
Based on the results presented in table 4 we conclude that our constructed variable
for environmental uncertainty, which we computed as a dummy out of the
coefficient of variation of sales and of the return on assets has a clear negative
impact on firm performance (the financial accounting indicator). This indicates that
the extent of stability of the corporate environment is positively related to the
success of the firm.
Also, the interaction effects with environmental dynamics as a moderating variable
are tested. From this analysis it becomes evident that, although environmental
uncertainty has a clear direct relationship with performance, it has no significance
as a moderating variable. Only in one case the interaction with size of the board
leads to a significant result. Indicating (instead of the hypothesized inverted U-
shaped relationship) a U-shaped relationship between RVC and performance. The
minimum of this U-curve is about 6, suggesting that this number of board members
or more lead to better performance. This is contrary to our hypothesized optimal
size of the board in the sense of a maximum (entrenchment hypothesis). A U-
shaped relationship might be interpreted as follows: when the number of board
members is relatively low (in this case < 6), there is probably little (outside)
control, directors are probably well known to management, and therefore it is
plausible that management actions have a negative influence on performance of the
firm.
In general, we find no evidence for the effect of the composition of the board on
firm performance. Apparently, in the Dutch context outsiders in supervisory boards
do not have a significant impact on corporate performance. Perhaps this result is
not quite surprising, as we observed in sections 2.1 and 2.3, the literature on this
topic has produced rather mixed evidence as regards to the impact of outsiders in22
supervisory boards. The (non) results of the meta–study of Dalton et al. (1998) are
in this respect clearly confirmed. Furthermore, as most of the firms of our sample
for the greater part have external members in their supervisory boards, it is also
from a statistical perspective not a surprise that no significant impact on
performance could be traced. A topic for subsequent research will be a more
specific measurement of outside impact on firm performance. Also, the suggestion
of Dalton et al. (1998: 284) to follow a potentially more promising avenu for future
research might be fruitful: namely to address the board composition by digging into
the relationship between subcommittee composition (e.g. audit, renumeration) and
firm performance.
All in all, we characterize our results as very little evidence for the hypotheses
postulated in section 2.3, but we consider this analysis a useful starting point for
subsequent research at the relationship between TMT and board attributes and
corporate performance in the Netherlands. Future research in this respect needs to
cover a longer time period, to take into account more dynamical factors (and
variability) and causality (c.f. Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).
Finally, we conclude that Dutch shareholders not only are ill-protected, but also
cannot hope that they will have immediate higher expected returns by influencing
the composition of the board. Reducing uncertainty that the firm faces is by far
more efficient than changing attributes of supervisory boards. This leaves the
question why Dutch firm performance is so prosperous without appropriate
influence of shareholders still unanswered.23
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Opmerkingen/vragen m.b.t. paper
dd. 17 februari 1999
-  Ik heb in de tekst een aantal vragen opgenomen, deze zijn vet weergegeven.
-  Aan het basismodel van Chirinko et al. wordt Environment toegevoegd als
afzonderlijke- en als interactievariabele.
-  De hypotheses zijn nu geformuleerd als relaties tussen variabelen in de vorm
van een ‘inverted U-shaped’ relatie. Is dit de beste manier? Of moeten we
gewoon eerst van lineaire associaties uitgaan en die toetsen en vervolgens niet
lineaire verbanden ook onderzoeken  (zowel kwadratisch voor inverted U-
shaped relaties als log-relaties)?
-  De bedoeling is om voor alle hypothesen steeds systematisch dezelfde analyses
te doen. Er is al wat voorwerk verricht (zie bijgaande setje van uitdraaien:
deels ook gebruikt in huidige versie van het paper).
-  Voor het vervolgpaper (Academy of Management-congres en Journal) moeten
we bezien welke variabelen we nog toevoegen (zie bijvoorbeeld Spencer Stuart
boekje: bevat 1996 data over 100 Nederl. boards) en de data van 1997
toevoegen. Dat wil ik ook wel doen!
Enkele zaken om te onthouden:
-  Dit soort onderzoek toevoegen aan ESR-verhaal (combinatie met AVW en
Boone et al. UM)
-  Postdoc of iemand anders moet databestand bijhouden
-  Trust als variabele toevoegen?28
Sheet:
It simply does not appear that there is any evidence of a substantive bivariate
relationship between board composition and financial performance. Nor is there
any evidence of moderating influences; these sub group analyses, too, are largely a
function of a series of constructive replications based on samples drawn, with
replacement, from the set of largest U.S. corporations.
Source: Dalton et al. (1998)
54 empirical studies
159 usable samples (80% sub sets of Fortune 500)
n=40,16029
 The non-findings of this research might be due to the limitations of cross-section
research:
-  The causality of the relationships might be the other way around. Performance
in a certain year might lead to changes in TMT/board attributes (e.g. Barnhart
et al., 1994).
-  Also, the attributions of TMT/boards might influence strategic decisions and
thereby indirectly performance. It is plausible that there is a time lag between
the strategic decisions, the implementation of these decisions, and the results of
these decisions (performance)